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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of alternative methods for scaling environmental compensation. When 'polluters' damage environmental resources (fish, birds, water bodies, habitat etc) or the ecosystem services they provide (recreation, flood control, carbon cycling, etc), they are frequently responsible for compensating the public for the residual environmental injuries, i.e., the interim loss in human well-being that remain even after clean-up activities and damage-reducing measures have been undertaken, or financial compensation for market losses has been paid. Environmental compensation is provided in the form of resourcebased projects (rather than money) that restore, enhance, or protect resources or services (hereafter "resources") of a similar type, quality, and/or value to those that were injured. A key welfare economics issue is "how much is enough" compensation to ensure equity for the victim, effective deterrence toward polluters, and socially profitable outcomes.
The value of the victim's interim loss is the monetary compensation needed to restore the individual to the pre-spill level of utility (Dunford et al. 2004 ). However, the US and EU statutes preclude monetary payment of compensation to victims, requiring instead a resourcebased compensation project. Given this restriction on the compensation mechanism, damage assessment has evolved in the US and EU to focus on the direct scaling of resources required to make the public whole rather than on the monetary assessment of damages (Flores and Thacher 2002; Lipton et al. 2008) .
A high profile example of ex post environmental compensation was the valuation and restoration of injured wildlife populations following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Exxon incurred costs of over $1.1 billion in the years following the spill related to clean up, damage assessment, and compensatory restoration (this was in addition to $4.5 billion in fines relating to punitive damages, EVOSTC 2012). As Carson et al. (2003) point out, the costly restoration incurred by Exxon may explain the reduction in the number of very large oil spills in the US compared to other countries during the 1990s. This evidence is consistent with the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), which suggests that shipping companies doing business in US waters are more likely to internalize these environmental repair costs by taking additional spill prevention measures. The costs associated with the BP Gulf oil spill in 2010 are as yet unknown but a $20 billion compensation fund has already been established and a recent settlement agreement suggested no cap on compensatory damages (AP 2012) . Though these two oil spills are admittedly exceptional events, they bring to the fore questions of social opportunity costs associated with compensating environmental damage.
Historically, compensation has been driven by ex post legal obligations to clean up and repair de facto environmental injuries. These ex post scenarios in the US are driven primarily by the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations while in the EU they are driven by the Environmental Liability Directive (EU Directive 2004/35/EC; Brans 2008) . (1)). International treaties also require compensation for environmental damage, but are not as strict as US regulations (Huguenin et al 2011). and US statutes the following cost components can be recovered from the responsible polluter following environmental damage:
• Component 1: cost of immediate clean up and response to a disaster in the case of ex post compensation (generally assessed separately from the three components below); • Component 2: costs of speeding resource recovery so that the damaged resource returns to (or toward) the pre-damage baseline, if feasible (referred to as primary restoration 2 ); • Component 3: diminution in value of the resources pending restoration, known as the "interim loss" (Figure 1 ), which, in monetary terms is frequently valued as the cost of providing compensatory/complementary restoration. This component is required if the resource does not quickly return to pre-damage baseline levels; and • Component 4: The reasonable costs of assessing the damages (e.g., ecological data collection, expert assessment/analysis, long-term monitoring, adjustments to the compensation project over time, etc).
Together, these four components make up the compensatory payment required of the polluter or, as I will argue, society's opportunity costs associated with compensating environmental injuries. Although the first, second and fourth components are straight-forward to estimate and recover, they are excluded from the conventional scaling method of Equivalency Analysis (EA) which focuses exclusively on compensating the victim's interim loss (component 3).
This paper considers the scaling question on a broader level by examining the total social opportunity costs of compensating environmental damage. I propose that a compensatory project is a social investment and should therefore be subject to a test of social efficiency: Could society use these scarce resources --collected from the polluter on the public's behalf --in a more productive manner? If so, an EA-scaled compensation payment that provides ostensible benefits to the victims (equity) may be unnecessarily costly (inefficient) to society. For example, if the victim owns part of the polluting firm, he/she may be "worse off" after the compensation has been paid. To address this, I suggest a compensatory scaling framework that addresses the trade-offs facing society: Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). Atkinson and Mourato (2008) suggest that despite an "upsurge in its influence" environmental CBA remains on the periphery as a tool to aid decision-making, leading the authors to question "... why CBA is relied upon to inform some environmental decisions but not others" (p. 336).
Section 2 provides background on the conventional EA approach to scaling resource-based compensation, while Section 3 highlights its shortcomings. Section 4 proposes a new approach based on CBA. Section 5 provides a numerical illustration and Section 6 identifies a number of theoretical and practical implications of the two compensatory approaches. Section 7 concludes.
Compensatory scaling with Equivalency Analysis (EA)
Equivalency Analysis (EA) is the dominant 3 method for scaling resource-based compensation based on the size of the interim loss (NOAA 1995; Lipton et al 2008) . EA aims for 'equivalence' over time and space between the present value of the interim loss (debit) and present value of the subsequent resource gain (credit 4 ), as in Figure 1 . The interim loss is a function of, among other things, primary restoration, which is scaled using biological criteria aimed at improving the recovery rate of the damaged resource. Primary restoration indirectly affects social welfare because it reduces the size of the interim loss and, thus, the compensatory payment. In contrast, natural recovery leads to an increase in the interim loss (all else equal) by the area X in Figure 1 (i.e., X is the benefit of primary remediation).
The debit and credit can occur in different locations and at different points in time, where the latter leads to discounting resource flows in the EA model (Cole and Kriström 2008a; NOAA 1999) . The value of the debit/credit (Y axis) is measured relative to the pre-damage or prerestoration level of the resource and can be captured in monetary or non-monetary terms (Cole and Kriström 2008b) . Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) values the debit/credit in terms of acres of habitat, Resource Equivalency Analysis (REA) relies on individual wildlife lost or gained (e.g., fish, birds, etc), and Value Equivalency Analysis (VEA) incorporates human preferences using either a monetary or non-monetary approach.
Economics and ecology play a role in EA but the latter is more prominent in HEA/REA, which aims for equivalence in biophysical terms. Key assumptions are that the non-monetary ecological metric captures the full suite of environmental changes and that the change in the metric reflects proportional changes in social welfare. Further, the real value of both lost and damaged resources is assumed constant over time (Unsworth and Bishop 1994; Dunford et al 2004) . These replacement cost approaches exclude the possibility that a resource's value to society may be a function of non-biophysical factors (e.g., number of people in an area, technology, scarcity, substitution possibilities, etc (Boyd and Wainger 2003) .
In contrast, VEA captures the non-biophysical criteria by measuring individuals' willingness to trade resource loss for resource gain. Because VEA ensures that the utility gain is equal to the utility loss (measured in present value terms), it is considered to be a more defensible welfaretheoretic approach. As such it is the primary focus of this article. VEA is useful in cases when the damaged and restored resources are not perfect substitutes, when compensation is provided off-site and may have distributional consequences, or if we wish to measure individuals' preferences for trading resources over time (for applications see Breffel and Rowe 2002; Horas et al 2008; Parsons and Chang 2010 ; see also Thur and Barry 2006) . Across all three EA variations, the scale of the compensatory payment is unaffected by the cost of providing compensation, as the polluter is assumed liable.
3 Hampton and Zafonte (2002) note that nearly all oil spill damage assessment cases in California (8 large and 47 small cases) rely on REA or HEA, which are typologies of EA. The method was also used by the UN Claims Commission to evaluate Iraq's environmental liability due to oil damage in countries affected by the 1990-91 Gulf War (Payne 2011) 4 The credit in Figure 1 can may be divided into two parts: Compensatory restoration is the compensatory payment to offset the interim loss and assumes complete recovery of the damage resource. In the ELD context, complementary restoration may also be required as part of the compensatory payment when the resource is not expected to return to its pre-damage value (Lipton et al. 2008) . 
The EA model
Compensating variation (CV) is the theoretically correct measure for returning an individual to his/her pre-damage utility level. In a simple case where utility is assumed to be a function of individual i's income (y i ), the value of the environmental services derived from the damaged (E) and restored resources (E 0 ) --where these real resource values are assumed constant over time (Unsworth and Bishop 1994 ) --and the lost value associated with the environmental damage (the debit L), then CV i is defined as follows:
where V i 0 (.) is indirect utility prior to damage and compensation and V i 1 (.) reflects the after scenario. CV i can be positive (individual is willing to pay to obtain the net gain associated with the combined effects of the damage and compensatory restoration) or negative (individual requires compensation to remain indifferent because the combined effects result in a net loss). Jones and Pease (1997) suggest that the total loss to society from resource injury could be estimated by summing the CV measures in (1) across the affected population. However, Johansson and Kriström (2010) suggest that when evaluating non-marginal projects using CBA there are "strong arguments against the use of the sum of unweighted CVs" (p. 6) due in part to the Broadway paradox, 5 but also to the strong assumptions inherent in the implied utilitarian welfare function and the need for direct comparisons of cardinal utility (Pesky 2001) (The time 5 The paradox is that for non--marginal projects a positive sum of CVs can be obtained by a simple re--distribution of income in a perfect market economy (Blackorby and Donaldson 1990). component is ignored throughout this paper but could be included by expressing CV as a present value, see also footnote 14).
Given the resource-based restriction on the compensation mechanism, an individual can theoretically be compensated with improvements in E 0 (Unsworth & Bishop 1994; Jones & Pease 1997; Flores and Thacher 2002; Dunford et al 2004) . In this case the inequality that must hold is
where R EA represents the scale of a resource-based compensatory payment that is sufficient to satisfy the CV i measure in (1). Note that L and R EA are measured and provided in resource terms but may be valued using monetary or non-monetary measures of utility. The scale of resource restoration (R EA ) chosen by the individual to ensure he/she is no worse off is assumed to be a function of the exogenous variables E, E 0 , and L. In theory, income should also affect R EA yet the conventional EA model described in the literature assumes a priori that income does not affect the compensation payment (Jones & Pease 1997; Flores & Thacher 2002; Zafonte & Hamton 2007 ) (I suggest below that the cost of compensation should affect income 6 ). Thus, one interpretation of equation (2) is that income is assumed linearly separable in utility, i.e., the solution does not involve y i . Further, given heterogeneous preferences R EA should be indexed to the individual (R iEA ) but in practice the non-exclusivity and non-excludability of the resourcebased compensation mechanism ensures that R EA is necessarily the same for all individuals, leading to both winners and losers.
7 Therefore, (2) only holds in the aggregate (Jones and Pease 1997) and the subscript i is absent from both R EA and L. Aggregation issues are tied to the compensation mechanism itself rather than the scaling methodology --a subject to which I return in Section 5.1.
Shortcomings of the EA approach
The critique from the economics literature has focused predominantly on equity issues, i.e., whether a compensatory project scaled using EA adequately offsets the welfare loss of those who suffer from an environmental injury. For example, Flores and Thatcher (2002) suggest that monetary metrics are the only theoretically correct approach to measuring accurate compensation for victims. Dunford et al. 2004 and Hampton 2007 suggest that HEA and REA may provide reasonable non-monetary approximations under certain assumptions. Unsworth and Bishop (1994) introduced REA noting that the replacement cost approach inherent in a non-monetary approach is inferior from a valuation perspective relative to VEA, yet the former has been upheld by US Courts (Dunford et al 1994; Thompson 2002) . 6 Besides the cost of compensation which is discussed in Section 3, one commenter pointed out that income may change due to direct effects from damage, i.e., an oil spill may affect the incomes of fishermen or the tourism industry. A large spill may affect relative prices through increases in oil prices or via stricter industry regulations.
7 Flores and Thacher (2002) argue that, given a sufficient aggregate compensatory payment, there would not be any losers if money is the compensation mechanism, as it is divisible and excludable such that each individual receives his/her CV. But this is a academic point, given the resource-based legal restriction.
Yet, even the VEA approach does not, in general, guarantee a victim is "no worse off" because its welfare assessment defines the debit narrowly and exclusively as the interim loss, obscuring a larger focus on the efficiency of carrying out the subsequent compensatory project. Note that equation (2) implicitly assumes that the polluter pays and individual i's utility is in no way affected by the cost of the compensation payment.
8 This assumption may not hold if the individual (i) owns capital invested in the polluting firm; (ii) is a taxpayer in a scenario where the government pays for part of the compensation or clean up costs; 9 or (iii) is a consumer of a product produced by a monopolistic polluter, i.e., the firm is not a price taker and therefore may exert influence on prices the consumer pays in response to the government's compensatory requirement. In short, equation (2) does not account for the opportunity cost of compensating environmental damage, which may be so high that the individual's utility may fall, thus invalidating the equality. Even if none of the above scenarios hold for a specific individual, the compensatory damages in monetary terms collected from the polluter on the public's behalf represents scarce societal resources which, it could be argued, should be subject to a test of social efficiency. This raises the question of whether the general EA framework in (2) is satisfactory from a social welfare perspective. I examine this assertion through the VEA typology, which is generally regarded in the literature as a more defensible welfare approach to scaling (Jones and Pease 1997; Flores and Thacher 2002) .
Parson and Kang (2010) apply VEA to scale a compensatory project that improves beach recreation:
In our analysis, we seek compensatory restoration projects that pass a Kaldor-Hicks Test. Does the monetary value of the restoration project equal or exceed the monetary value of the loss due to the beach closure? If so, the restoration project is potentially Pareto improving (ignoring the cost of restoration itself). (p. 454)
The author's parenthetical note confirms that in practice the cost of providing the compensatory payment is excluded from the scaling process. By focusing narrowly on the environmental quality parameter in an individual's utility function (i.e., the interim loss), EA may miss the effect of net income changes. Thus, in the EA framework even a strict "value equivalence" measured in terms of utility may not necessarily ensure no net loss of welfare.
But what does it actually cost society to compensate for environmental damage? Flores and Thacher (2002) suggest that VEA is preferable as it "... requires the cost-benefit analyst to simultaneously value the losses and the gains" (p. 174). While losses and gains are valued in an 8 Nor, by assumption, is individual i's utility affected by altruism. The argument being that some individuals may, in fact, be worse off even if they receive their CV because another individual is worse off from having to pay the compensation. 9 Note that the government may incur the cost of compensation if the polluter cannot be found, the costs exceed the polluter's ability to pay, or in cases of extraordinary damage. It was fortuitous from a fiscal perspective that the environmental liability associated with the 2010 Gulf oil spill in the US was assumed by a deep-pocketed multinational like BP, who volunteered additional compensatory payments for public relations reasons. A firm with less means may have required large federal expenditures on clean up and restoration (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2011) . A similar case with a different outcome was the nuclear meltdown in Japan in 2011, which one can assume involved trade-offs in unanticipated government expenditures.
EA framework, they do not resemble the broad "losses and gains" typically captured by a CBA. In fact, Flores and Thacher's cost-benefit analyst is doomed from the start because the EA framework systematically underestimates losses by failing to capture --and then incorporate into the scaling process --the total costs imposed on society from the damage and subsequent compensation. In addition to the lost interim value of resources (valued as willingness to accept compensation or, in some cases, as the cost of replacing equivalent resources) society incurs other impacts such as the cost of clean up and response (if applicable), the cost of primary remediation to speed resource recovery (if feasible), and the cost of assessment. As shown in Figure 2 , the total cost to society will always exceed the interim loss. Given a monetized interim loss as is possible in VEA, one could calculate society's total cost of damage and subsequent compensation and compare this to the total benefit of the compensatory project. As Atkinson and Mourato (2008) 
Figure 2. Consideration of society's total opportunity cost in compensatory scaling
Unless the polluting firm is owned by one individual that is unaffected by both the damage and a subsequent compensation, the cost of compensation should influence the scale of the compensatory payment if one wishes to maximize net social welfare. In contrast, EA suggests 10 CBA has been discussed in the context of environmental compensation. In referring to US regulations Jones and Pease (1997) suggest that the scale of primary restoration should consider the benefits (area X in Figure 1 ) relative to "not only direct (financial) costs, but also any external environmental or public health impacts, as well as the opportunity costs of using public resources for this project relative to other uses. (p. 113) . Interestingly, this is only suggested for scaling primary restoration --which is a biological issue related to speeding resource recovery --rather than for compensatory/complementary restoration, which more directly addresses welfare impacts. that a resource-based compensatory payment is always welfare increasing since it addresses equity concerns (Riera 2008) . But efficiency may also be a relevant scaling criteria given that the economic damages (in monetary terms) resulting from environmental damage are collected on the public's behalf.
CBA scaling
Based on the shortcomings identified above I propose a revision to (2) that includes the cost of providing compensation c i >0:
Even if (net) income is assumed linearly separable in (3), it affects the compensation payment R i . The individual chooses the compensatory payment R i as a function of E, E 0 , L and c i , where the latter is a function of R i (as c i approaches zero, R i =R EA ). In short, the benefits of compensation (R i ) must exceed the costs (c i ) for the individual to remain indifferent. Equation (3) seeks equality in utility. I propose a further revision that ensures a net gain in utility following compensation. That is, CBA scaling seeks an optimal compensatory payment R i * such that the net change in welfare for the individual (w i ) is defined as follows
Equation (4) reflects a more general trade-off: As R i * increases so too does c i (for a given L). Some individuals may be willing to incur certain costs to obtain a higher --and more optimal --compensatory payment. In principle, a CBA-scaled payment is one where the total benefits of the project (what an individual is willing to pay to obtain it) exceeds the opportunity costs (what an individual is willing to give up). As with equation (2) distributional impacts are inevitable and compensation can only be provided in the aggregate, but R i * is indexed to the individual because of the net income effects of paying for compensation, which may vary across individuals.
The trade-off implied by CBA scaling is analogous to the trade-off in determining an optimal level of pollution (see e.g., Hanley et al. 2007) . Figure 3 illustrates the optimal amount of an environmental resource (E*) and assumes E 0 is a perfect substitute for E such that the two are interchangeable on the X axis. Damage increases from right to left (less E) and a positive compensatory payment increases from left to right (more E perfectly substitutable with E 0 ).
11
The optimal compensatory payment R i * is the one that augments a substitutable resource (E 0 ) such that it moves the individual toward E*, which is the intersection of the individual's marginal benefit curve (WTP to avoid environmental injury, L) and marginal cost curve (WTP to obtain compensation). At E 1 , the marginal benefit of avoiding an exogenous injury L exceeds the marginal costs, suggesting a positive R i *. If the MCs exceed the MBs of additional compensation (i.e., c i >R i in equation (3)), then reaching E* requires a negative compensatory 11 I assume the decline in marginal utility from losing one unit of the resource is equally balanced by an increase in marginal utility from gaining one unit of the resource, i.e., the assumed utility function is linear in the two resources. This may not be the case with normal goods, which generally require a higher CV than EV to compensate for the same exogenous change (in e.g., prices or environmental quality) payment, i.e., allowing additional uncompensated damage. Point F represents the individual's maximum valuation associated with the provision of E, i.e., the marginal value of additional E (or E 0 ) is zero to the right of point F.
Figure 3. An individual's optimal level of environmental damage under a CBA-scaling framework
Given an exogenous and assumed marginal loss L= E* -E 1 , an individual's debit under EA is equivalent to ABDE, which is also the assumed benefit of the subsequent payment, R EA (i.e., EA scaling only captures gross benefits). The implication is that any increase in damage starting from F, followed by a positive compensatory payment R EA , leads to a net benefit to the individual. On an aggregate level, this could be reflected in the 'no net loss' of biodiversity policy that is often used to motivate ex ante compensation (EC 2011) . Figure 3 suggests that such a policy may lead to a net loss of welfare for individuals for whom R EA < c i . However, given a specific welfare function, EA may represent a reasonable scaling approach for a 'no net loss' of biodiversity policy (see Implications below).
CBA scaling, on the other hand, suggests that the net benefit to the individual of compensating L is ABC. It reflects the trade-off between the increased environmental quality due to compensation and the increased cost to the individual of implementing it. Given identical compensatory projects, the optimal compensatory payment under CBA, R i *, will be less than EA resource payment, as the former nets out the marginal cost of compensation (assuming E 0 is not an undersupplied public good, see Implications). In contrast to EA, CBA scaling aims for no net loss of welfare.
Numerical illustration
Assuming fully measurable cardinal utility and a generalized social welfare function I compare the compensatory payments suggested by EA and CBA scaling using a simple numerical illustration.
12 First, I estimate R EA from equation (2), which is necessarily the same for all individuals. Second, I estimate the marginal utility to each individual of an additional unit of compensation, assuming that each individual faces certain costs to obtain that unit. I then compare these payments to determine, for example, when R EA --which is simpler to estimate --may provide a reasonable proxy for the optimal compensatory payment R i * without causing an individual's utility to decline. Finally, I consider net social welfare by aggregating individual welfare impacts under various assumptions.
Assume a (logarithmic) Cobb-Douglas utility function for two individuals (i=1,2) in a 'society' where commodity prices and constant terms are suppressed. The indirect utility of individual i is
where E>L>0, y i >c i >0, E 0 >0 and E and E 0 are weakly substitutable (e.g., E = αE 0 ). I ignore preference weights on the parameters. 13 Note that a specific form of (5) is when c i =0 and R= R EA . As above, compensation can only be provided in the aggregate. We assume R is provided in resource terms but it (and L) is valued using monetary or non-monetary measures of utility (i.e., the following reflects a VEA). For simplicity I ignore discounting. 
Given our assumed utility function in (5) we can solve for R EA in equation (2) when c 1 =c 2 =0,
which gives the "cost-free" compensation payment that ensures the individual is no worse off in terms of utility. Income y i is absent from (7) due to the separability of income assumed in the EA model (see discussion of equation (2) above).
The marginal utility to individual i of an additional unit of compensation, based on (5) is 12 See Johansson (1998) and Persky (2001) for the assumptions required for interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons. See also Johansson and Kriström (2010) for a similar numerical illustration comparing EA to CBA.
13 Therefore I choose parameter values for E, E 0 , L and net income that are relatively similar to avoid a high degree of marginal substitutability but retain an implicit assumption that society has more income than resources. 14 Introducing discounting may influence the results if the compensatory gains or losses accrue over a long time horizon.
Setting this equal to zero to optimize and substituting in (6) gives a solution for the optimal compensatory payment for individual i (R i *), given existing restoration technology in (6).
Note that the optimal compensatory payment R i * can be considered the cost-efficient level as it is independent of L. Alternatively, one could estimate society's optimal payment R* based on total income (Y) and total costs C=A+R*B (where C=c 1 +c 2 ) assuming that each individual faces the same cost function and that costs are distributed equally (I relax this assumption in part below).
The net change in welfare for the individual, w i , is the difference between final and initial utility levels.
The three terms in equation (11) represent the net environmental value lost, the net environmental value gained, and the net cost to each individual. Note that R in equation (11) could be R EA , R*, or R i * depending on the payment against which we wish to assess individual welfare.
Finally, the net change in social welfare (SW) across the two individuals in society is ΔSW = w 1 *a 1 + w 2 *a 2
where a 1 and a 2 represent welfare weights for the two individuals. Figure 4 considers the compensatory payment R in resource units (Y axis) as a function of the restored resource E 0 and reflects the following parameters: y 1 =50, y 2 =40, a 1 =5, a 2 =5, b 1 =.5, b 2 =1, and resource levels of E=20, and L=3 (note that X axis=20 indicates a 1:1 ratio of E 0 to E). The optimal compensatory payment (R*, R 1 * and R 2 *) reflects declining marginal utility of an additional unit of R, i.e., the individual benefits less from compensation as E 0 becomes more abundant (at E 0 =35 for individual 2 marginal utility becomes negative, i.e., additional damage is preferred to compensation). 15 In contrast the cost-free compensatory payment R EA that ensures 15 Even if the marginal costs of compensation are explicitly accounted for, the same result follows: the optimal payment declines as E 0 increases, although the y-intercept is lower and the negative slope a bit steeper. Because of equivalence in resource units increases in E 0 i.e., more R is needed as E 0 increases in order to maintain the equality in (2) (the slope of R EA increases as L increases) These differences in scaling approaches --R EA increases indefinitely and R* decreases indefinitely in E 0 --guarantees an intersection, regardless of functional form assumed.
Figure 4. Comparing R EA to the optimal compensatory payment (R* or R i *)
R i * provides a point of reference for assessing the welfare impact to individual i for a given loss and compensation scenario suggested by R EA . Given the parameters in this example, R EA < R i * at low levels of E 0 , suggesting that an EA proxy for an optimal payment will at least not make an individual worse off under these conditions, although he could be better off if he was able to pay to reach his optimal compensation payment R i * (but if the individual has to pay for the R EA then he is worse off). However, for larger values of E 0 , R EA begins to exceed R i * all else equal. In this case R EA will lead to a net utility loss because it overestimates the benefits of compensation to the individual (marginal benefit of compensation declines under R i * but increases under R EA as E becomes scarce relative to E 0 ). Thus, given a desire to compensate for environmental losses, we have a general rule for when the easier-to-calculate R EA may represent a reasonable proxy for the individual benefits of a compensation payment (illustrated in Figure 4 by the thick dark line): If R EA < R i * then ... ... the equity-focused compensatory payment (R EA ) can be used as a proxy for R, as it will at least not decrease utility the complexity of the quadratic solution and the fact that it does not add much to the discussion, I focus only on the marginal benefits side of the equation.
for individual i. Under what conditions might R EA < R i * such that an individual's net utility does not fall?
• Marginal damage. All else equal, if the net environmental costs of damage are small (L small relative to E), the intersection of the two lines occur at high values on the X axis, allowing for a greater possibility that R EA < R i *. This holds even if costs are very small relative to income.
• Marginal costs. All else equal when the net income effects of compensation are small, then either the y intercept of R i * increases (parameter a i ) or the negative slope increases (parameter b i ) providing for a greater possibility that R EA < R i *. This condition holds even when the environmental damage is non-marginal. Figure 4 indicates there are winners and losers depending on the compensation payment made. To assess the net social welfare impacts of the two approaches, assume that R in equation (11) equals R EA (equation 7) or R* (equation 10). The previous numerical assumptions regarding E, E 0 and L remain but R* distributes costs evenly across the population such that y i , a i , and b i are no longer relevant. Figure 5 shows that the unweighted social welfare outcome under R EA is always negative if L>0 and C>0 (the first two terms in equation (11) cancel but the loss of income guarantees an unweighted loss). Point B (Figure 4 ) corresponds to an EA payment of R EA =1.76 (E 0 =10), which leads to an unweighted loss of welfare (ΔSW = -0.15 or about a 0.8% change from baseline utility levels).
Aggregation
Given an even distribution of costs across a population that faces a common cost structure, R* leads to a positive change in SW when E 0 is approximately equal to or less than E ( Figure 5 ). Point A (Figure 4) corresponds to an optimal payment of R*=21.7 (E 0 =10), which leads to an unweighted net gain in social utility (ΔSW=0.35 or 2% change). Note if L>3, or several small losses accumulate over time, then R*=21.7 may not be sufficient for a positive utility gain. This suggests that society may profit from even more compensation than EA recommends for a specific loss. One possible explanation is that E 0 may be an undersupplied public good (see discussion). Point C (Figure 4) illustrates an unweighted social indifference point: given the parameter assumptions, ΔSW=0 when R=3.0 which is nearly twice as large as the EA suggested payment.
Figure 5. Unweighted social welfare outcome of R EA and R* for L=3
The question of whether society is "better off" depends upon who pays for the compensation and the subjective welfare weights applied. Given our parameters, R EA ensures no net loss of welfare only if the welfare weights a 1 =0 and a 2 =1.0 are assumed, which may reflect the PPP if individual 1 is the polluter (note a net gain is possible if costs are distributed optimally from the start 17 ). Alternatively, R* leads to a negative change in social welfare under the same 'payer' assumptions (e.g., individual #1 is the polluter) but alternative weights a 1 =0.9 and a 2 =0.1. The compensation principle, based on Kaldor-Hicks, could be an alternative approach to judging the social welfare outcome, but it too requires ethical judgments as it assumes each individuals' gain in utility is valued equally. This result underscores the fact that R EA aims for equity for the victim. Further, the social profitability of either scaling approach requires strong ethical judgments.
Illustrative summary
This numerical illustration is admittedly simple and dependent on a number of assumptions and parameters. For example, it relies on a natural log form for the utility function which inherently leads to very small changes in utility at high parameter values and very large utility changes at 17 If the costs are optimally distributed from the start under EA, then individual #1 pays very little, but there is still a loss of welfare assuming equal weights. Altering the weights (e.g., a 1 =.2 and a 2 =.8) leads to a positive gain in welfare.
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Change in SW --R* Change in SW --Rea low values. Utility is assumed to be linear in the parameters, which may not be the case with income. Preference parameters are excluded from (5), which are in any case inherently arbitrary. The cost function is fairly simple, as is the assumption of even cost distribution in determining R* (Equation 10). The illustration is based on VEA rather than HEA/REA but this strengthens the argument; namely, that the former is a welfare-theoretic approach that explicitly measures individuals' utility change in monetary terms but it too may still result in a utility decline depending on how costs are distributed.
Despite these simplifications, the exercise highlights differences across the two scaling approaches. EA suggests that compensation is always positive and increases indefinitely in proportion to the environmental loss. These results are driven by the fact that equation (7) excludes the cost of compensation (thus overestimating the benefit of compensation to the individual) and that compensation increases as the restored resource is more abundant relative to the damaged resource. Both of these findings are counterintuitive from a scarcity perspective as they do not consider the trade-offs that typically motivate environmental regulation. R* considers the cost of compensation (based on an assumed restoration technology) and the supply of the restored resource and implies a declining marginal utility of additional compensation. As such R* more accurately captures the benefit of compensation to the individual, which may be higher or lower than the benefit implied by an EA-scaled payment.
The optimal compensatory payment scaled by CBA acknowledges environmental trade-offs in scaling compensation.
18 Whereas regulatory intervention for air and water pollution externalities are generally motivated by an acknowledged trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection, the dominant use of EA --which aims to return to the baseline state of the world regardless of costs --would seem to imply that policy makers need not consider such trade-offs in compensatory scaling. But this is counter-intuitive from a scarcity perspective. CBA scaling acknowledges society's scarce resources and compares the marginal costs to the marginal benefits of a compensatory payment, rather than assuming all damage is welfare decreasing.
When might R EA give a similar answer or a reasonable proxy for R* (assuming that E 0 is not an undersupplied public good)? First, R EA =R* if C=0, but this is not reasonable in a world of scarce resources. Second, if the state of the environment is E* in Figure 3 , then for a small marginal increase in damage R* would be approximately zero and R EA would be a positive but small payment. In this case the error in using R EA as a proxy for R* would be small. Another way to look at this is to ask when R EA is efficient 19 ? R EA may be efficient if society is at E* because EA's "return to baseline" criterion mirrors CBA's criterion that positive compensation is warranted when MB>MC. Another scenario where R EA may be reasonable is if firms have maximized production without environmental constraints (i.e., point F in Figure 3) . In a world without constraints, there are no trade-offs nor optimal payments and the goal of returning to baseline without consideration of costs may be justifiable.
Finally, the results from this exercise underscore the importance of the normative decisions required to operationalize both approaches. That is, determining whether society "is no worse off" requires value judgments in aggregating individuals' required compensatory payments. The public good nature of the compensation mechanism further complicates this assessment.
Implications & underlying assumptions
Because environmental liability regulations in the US and EU are designed to fulfill both a compensatory and deterrent goal, trade-offs are inevitable in selecting a scaling method. The results of this paper underscore the fundamentally different assumptions underlying the EA and CBA approaches. I discuss some of these below.
Property rights. EA was developed as a tool to implement regulations that were motivated by the Polluter Pays Principle, PPP (EC 2000) . To address the external market failure EA seeks equity for the victim (compensatory goal) through a regulatory requirement that encourages polluters to undertake damage prevention measures today to avoid future repair costs (deterrence goal). Rather than ignoring the opportunity cost of compensation, EA assumes it is a private opportunity cost and the polluter is responsible for paying, or internalizing, it. The outcome is efficient from a cost-internalization perspective. There is no social trade-off because C is seen as a private cost and equity for the victim takes precedent (Note that cost internalization is hard to implement in practice not only because of the difficulty of measuring uncertain future costs, but also the difficulty of pricing environmental resources --see "credibility" below).
This private opportunity costs assumption inherent in EA is based on a priori assumptions about property rights as it assumes that public users of the damaged resource own the resource and thus have a right to an uncontaminated environment. A reduction in 'their' environmental quality is compensated for by the polluter. Under this assumption, C is absent from (2). Note further that the transaction costs associated with assessing damage are ignored. If these transaction costs are minor (which is debatable) then the Coase theorem suggests that the environmental compensation legislation --and thus the EA method that arose from it --could, in theory, reach a similar outcome under an alternative property rights assumption (Hanley et al 2007) . Under a Victim Pays Principle (VPP), the victim's WTP to prevent (compensate) the firm from polluting its own resource would be excluded and scaling would be reduced to a simple comparison of debit to credit. Just as under the PPP, the VPP outcome is efficient from a cost-internalization perspective but equity (for the polluter) takes precedent.
Whether or not we can achieve an efficient compensatory outcome with alternative property right assumptions is ultimately an empirical issue. A similar compensation scheme that takes a different position on property rights is Direct Payments (DPs) for conservation (Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Milne and Niesten. 2009 ), where developed countries provide financial compensation payments to subsistence resource users in developing countries in return for the provision of ecosystem services (e.g., carbon sequestration from a forest). DPs address a market failure (in this case, under-provision of a public good) through economic incentives and also seek cost-internalization by scaling payments based on opportunity costs (in this case, incurred by those individuals providing the ecosystem services, see Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995) . Despite these similarities 20 DPs assign property rights to the victims. Perhaps as a result, DP schemes create an alternative solution to environmental damage: voluntary markets. In some sense Coase's Theorem is upheld, despite the fact that transaction costs are high for both environmental compensation and DP schemes (although the environmental outcome may be less certain under the voluntary schemes).
Equity and Efficiency. The inevitable trade-off between the competing economic goals of equity and efficiency is manifested in each scaling method, which requires ethical decisions about which criteria is most important to society (Daly 1992) . For example, if the only goal of compensation is equity we could require polluters (or victims, if we assume polluters own the resource) to spend considerable funds to measure ecological changes, human preferences, and impact on social welfare before scaling a compensatory payment, but these transaction costs may lead to social inefficiency (the high assessment costs associated with the Exxon Valdez damage assessment was one reason the EA method was suggested in the early 1990s). Alternatively, we could aim for a socially optimal level of damage prevention measures, but in doing so we may remove resources available for compensating victims (equity is the driving factor in the existence of oil spill compensation funds, which pay compensation even when the responsible party is unknown or financially unable to do so --note the conflict with efficiency in the case of the latter, USCG 2006).
EA's focus on equity could be the result of particular view on the shape of society's welfare function. By implicitly assigning a lower weight to the polluter's utility (which decreases from incurring the compensatory cost) relative to the pollutees' utility (which increases from receiving the compensatory project), EA seems to imply particular value judgments. These types of implicit weights are typically absent in the conventional "efficiency-driven" CBA approach where the welfare of those who own the polluting firm is no less important than the welfare of those who suffer from its damaging activity.
21 While CBA scaling benefits the "average person," EA scaling downgrades the welfare of pollutees by suggesting that residual damage be compensated 'at all costs.' A fundamentally different starting point for scaling is to focus on social efficiency rather than equity for a particular group. For example, R* measures the marginal 'social' utility of an additional unit of compensation generally, without discriminating against polluters/victims or owners/non-owners. In doing so R* considers society's opportunity cost. Thus, scarce resources used for compensation are compared to the next best use such as an alternative compensation project (which costs less or provides greater benefits) or private investment in the polluting firm (which may lead to social benefits such as increased producer surplus or increased employment). Alternatively, if the government is providing the compensation, C represents forgone social investment (e.g., health care, education, road, etc), which could be compared to the marginal benefits of additional compensation (though fundamental to economics, the concept of opportunity cost is sometimes missed -see Ferraro & Taylor 2005) . 20 One of the key differences with DP schemes is that the compensatory mechanism is monetary, which removes one of the challenges of scaling resource-based payments using EA or CBA.
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Although social weights have long been discussed in the literature (Dasgupta et al 1972) , the distinction between equity and distribution is generally maintained in practice. However, Kanninen and Kriström (1992) conduct a sensitivity analysis of a CBA under alternative social weights and find that social profitability is a function of the social weights used. R* assumes that it may be efficient to extract a willingness to pay from 'resource-owning victims' in return for an improved compensatory outcome. This explains why the optimal payment R* is greater than R EA in Figure 4 (at low levels of E 0 ), as individuals are assumed willing to trade money in exchange for a higher level of utility. Such trade-offs are not allowed in EA as the victim's WTP is assumed to be zero (legally, they are not allowed to pay).
Despite individuals' willingness to pay for improved environmental outcomes under the CBA framework, a market failure arises from an incentive compatibility problem: individuals do not reveal their true WTP and thus it is undersupplied (Johansson 1991) . This type of market failure may provide an explanation to the counterintuitive outcome above; namely, that a socially profitable outcome resulted from R* but not from R EA at low levels of E 0 . To the extent that E 0 is in fact undersupplied in the real world (rather than as an assumed and variable parameter in the model), then it is reasonable to assert that an equity-focused compensation may miss a socially profitable project. Flores and Thacher (2002) , while making the point that a restricted compensation mechanism will generally make society worse off, note an exception: "unless the specific public good is undersupplied" (p. 171, footnote 1). This market failure may motivate the legal restriction on the compensation mechanism in the sense that policymakers wish to augment the undersupplied good. The restriction may be further justified to the extent that society's marginal rate of substitution for resources is higher than the price required to obtain them.
A credibility problem?
Why then have policy makers choosen --indeed, actively promoted 22 --the equity-focused EA method at the expense of efficiency? One reason may be that the mechanism for ensuring efficiency is price determined by supply and demand in a competitive market. Without markets it is difficult to measure a resource's opportunity costs, and thus 'efficient' resource allocations. Perhaps policy makers may have chosen equity (EA) over efficiency (CBA) due to a credibility problem: because they do not believe that non-market ecosystem services can be priced efficiently --i.e., estimating the MB curve in Figure 3 is too intractable --they rely instead on a simplified method that is easy to understand and articulate in liability regulations. In fact, there is plenty of evidence to support this idea. Unsworth and Bishop 1994 argued for the environmental annuity approach due to the difficulty of valuing environmental damage. Further, credibility concerns likely motivated the US government's decision to re-interpret the term "economic damages" under the NRDA regulations to reflect the cost of replacing the resources, rather than their true value (NOAA 1997; Jones and Pease 1997) . The EU's subsequent ELD essentially mimicked this approach. Perhaps the lack of a credible approach for pricing resources led resource economists to stress the adequacy of the transfer from polluter to victim as the standard for measuring the success of a resource-based compensatory payment. This is consistent with Stavins (1998) , who suggests that regulators are generally more interested in the distribution of environmental costs and benefits rather than an instrument's overall social efficiency.
If efficiency was the criteria for scaling then one would expect that resource injuries be compensated such that the payment reflects the true social cost of the injury (i.e., what society is willing to give up to prevent that injury). In this case, EA and CBA scaling should give the same 22 EA is explicitly preferred under EU's ELD (see Annex II) and the preferred approach under the US guidance on NRDA (NOAA 1997) . Further, it has been suggested as a means to scale biodiversity offsets (Ozdemiroglu et al 2009) answer. This is, in fact, the economic and legal standard for damage assessment (Flores and Thacher 2002) and is the argument put forth by Roach and Wade (2006) The replacement cost approach to valuation notwithstanding, the authors' underlying assumption is that the EA-scaled payment captures the true social value if and only if we scale the payment based on what society is willing to give up. Yet, if we truly believed this, then we would include "administrative and NRDA costs" (Components #2 and #4, see Section 1) when scaling ex post compensatory payments but EA considers only the lost interim value (Component #3).
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Perhaps a compensation payment scaled using EA would naturally resemble "CBA-type thinking" if we could price resources effectively.
Practical implications for policy makers. The primary contribution of CBA scaling is to bring to the fore questions of environmental trade-offs that have heretofore been lacking. In theory EA requires compensation regardless of the marginal benefit to society. 24 While it may be admirable from an environmental perspective to compensate for each individual wind turbine that causes raptor mortality, each wetland acre lost to development, or each marine mammal lost to an oil spill, CBA scaling suggests that the benefits of compensation should be compared to the costs of compensatory alternatives (C) and the health and quality of existing environmental resources (E and E 0 ). Species populations or habitats undergoing general decline for which compensatory projects are technical and economically feasible may be ripe for compensatory measures. Inevitably, however, these decisions require costly information and involve a high degree of uncertainty, including the possibility of ecological tipping points (Rockström et al 2009) and the potential for cumulative environmental impacts. Thus, what practical lessons can be drawn from this analysis?
Pending a better understanding of how ecological changes impact our well-being, a hybrid approach is perhaps warranted, which relies on EA's inherent simplicity but allows for complementary input from CBA-scaling. For example, Quetier and Lavorel (2011) suggest that the typical practice of ensuring ecological equivalence (the typical goal in an HEA/REA) should be considered separately from a process of "optimizing" the compensatory offset, i.e., keeping the ecological equivalence goal in a social welfare context. CBA provides an approach for optimizing with respect to efficiency, which may become increasingly relevant when the discussion turns to "oversizing" compensatory payments to address ecological uncertainty (Moilanen et al 2008) . CBA scaling could, for example, identify compensatory projects for which the costs associated with oversizing begin to outstrip the expected benefits from the project. Further, CBA approaches could complement the ad hoc criteria used in EA to select compensatory alternatives (NOAA 1997; Lipton et al 2008) . As one commenter pointed out, 23 I argue further that clean up costs (component #1) should also be included. 24 In practice a political decision suggests an arbitrary "L" (Figure 3 ) that is deemed acceptable. Anything beyond that is considered "significant damage" (in the case of the ELD) and requires compensation (Lipton et al 2008) .
some cases may be difficult for CBA scaling, such as when the damage is so large that the polluter would go bankrupt providing R* or the costs of providing R* exceeds even the government's ability (or willingness) to pay. However, the creation of compensation funds supported by potential polluters could address this, even if it conflicts somewhat with the cost internalization objective.
Conclusion
There are strong economic arguments for protecting the ecosystem services upon which human welfare depends and for ensuring equity when individuals are harmed by environmental damage. But protecting and enhancing ecosystem services requires that society spend time and resources that are necessarily unavailable for other purposes, which may also improve welfare. EA's focus on equity for the victims of environmental compensation may cause society to spend too much or too little on compensation, leading to potential social inefficiencies. A compensatory scaling process based on CBA, which accounts for society's opportunity cost of compensating environmental damage, provides an alternative. This paper tries to unravel some of the fundamentally different assumptions underlying the two scaling approaches. A key finding is that the inescapable environmental trade-offs facing society in compensating environmental damage are ignored in the EA framework.
The proposed scaling approach is more in line with governments' increased --but still limited --use of environmental CBA to steer society's scarce resources to a variety of environmental challenges (UK 2003; USEPA 2008) . It would appear that the question posed by Turner (2007) and Atkinson and Maurato (2008) namely --why is environmental CBA inconsistently applied to environmental investments? --is at least in part related to our inability to price resources to ensure efficient resource allocation. Without improvement in non-market valuation methods, we will continue to be challenged in finding a balance between equity and efficiency in compensating environmental injuries.
